

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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SHAPING THE REGIONAL STABILITY ENVIRONMENT
WITH RESERVISTS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:



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Shaping, in this work, is defined as military operations other than war (MOOTW), Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) and non-combat military operations listed in Theater Engagement Plan guidance but not assuming the characteristics of MOOTW or, in many cases, IDAD. When measuring the potential for part-time reservist involvement in the many types of operations listed under the headings above, we find that these reservist are most adept for primary roles in IDAD; most specifically for direct support in political, social and economic development. As a secondary role, part-time reservists can innovatively impart their civilian skills in support of many active duty shaping missions such as counterterrorism, counterdrugs, humanitarian assistance, exchanges and conferences.			
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Abstract of

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SHAPING THE REGIONAL STABILITY ENVIRONMENT WITH RESERVES

Introduction

With the advent of a smaller military force and the consequential reduction in permanent overseas basing, the National Command Authority¹ has sought to significantly increase the role of "Shaping" in establishing global stability. The increased importance afforded Shaping challenges theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs) to commit their limited resources for bolstered shaping activities while simultaneously maintaining a force capable of implementing the other two tenets of the national military strategy -- "Respond and Prepare Now".²

In an attempt to help CINCs keep combat forces ready for Respond and Prepare Now missions, I will explore the utility and practicality of employing a unique and underutilized resource for Shaping missions -- *the part-time Reservist*. If I can show that Reservists can satisfy CINC shaping needs on a scale much larger than currently practiced, then the implication is such that a CINC can opt to direct combat forces away from certain Shaping activities and on to Respond and Prepare Now Missions.

The impetus for this effort is the 1997 National Defense Panel Report, which states:

"The challenge confronting U.S. military planners is that the forces, training, and equipment used to maintain ready power projection capabilities do not necessarily lend themselves to the requirements of stability operations. The unpredictable and unique challenges generated by regional crises often require forces tailored to fit specific requirements. This will likely entail restructuring of some forces now focused on regional conflicts to conduct these less demanding but more likely contingencies. Reserve forces, for example, can provide skills that stem from their civilian specialties. Greater use of the reserve components to substitute for active units may also alleviate the operational and personnel tempo pressures on the active components and enable them to maintain their readiness for other missions."³

¹ U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (May 1997), U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (February 1996), U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era* (Washington, D.C., September 1997). Inclusion of reserves in shaping missions is also treated in Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Report on Reserve Component Programs*, (Washington, D.C., March 1998),

² *National Military Strategy*, 1-2.

³ National Defense Panel. *Report on Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C., 1997), 31.

On the surface, alleviating active duty forces' operational and personnel tempo with reserves and tapping reservist's civilian skills for shaping activities seem quite achievable; but are they really? To answer this, I will weigh the utility and practicality of employing part-time reservists against CINC shaping needs. If current practices prevent achievement of the above, but the *potential* for achievement is revealed, I will recommend possible remedies to that end.

For clarity and mutual understanding throughout this paper, I've narrowly defined the terms below. *Reservists* refers to part-time reservists from all military services and part-time Army and Air National Guard members. *CINC* for purposes of this paper only, refers to geographic combatant commanders only (i.e., Commanders-in-Chief of Pacific Command (USPACOM), Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Central Command (USCENTCOM) and European Command (USEUCOM). *Civilian Skills* refers to part-time reservists' civilian skills only. The term *Shaping* can encompass all national assets used in stabilizing particular countries or regions where national interests are at risk; but for this paper, Shaping will be confined to the military effort.

Shaping Defined

In our post-cold war world, threats to national security and interests are defined by regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats and unknowns⁴ instead of a single, well-known superpower. Our military might has drastically been reduced to a level incapable of meeting many simultaneous violent challenges to our national interest. In light of these two changes, the National Command Authority has decided to emphasize a proactive approach to promoting stability; and approach they call Shaping. It is intended to create the conditions which support peace and make war less likely. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to this proactive approach as preventive defense.⁵ In general, shaping includes deterrence, alliance-building and peacetime engagement. Although some would argue that some military operations other than war (MOOTW) are not Shaping activities because combat forces are employed, I will argue in this paper that most MOOTW activities indeed deter or engage – and should be included in the definition of Shaping.

As of February 1998, CINCs are required to translate the national military objective of "promoting peace and stability"⁶ to the operational level through the use of a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). The

⁴ National Military Strategy, 1

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Fulfilling the Role of Preventive Defense," *Defense Issues* 11, no 44 (May 13, 1996). Remarks by Defense Secretary William J. Perry to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

⁶ National Military Strategy, 1-2

TEP is to be "considered ...a new type of deliberate plan," so accordingly, CINCs must take into account challenges to theater security and stability, centers of gravity, and the political, military and economic environment when considering engagement options.⁷

Engagement options laid out for CINCs through the TEP process include humanitarian relief, counterdrug, sanction enforcement and peace operations, combined exercises and foreign military interaction such as combined training, combined education, military contacts, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance. CINCs are additionally allowed to plan engagement activities not specifically noted in TEP guidance.⁸

Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War identifies deterrence, conflict resolution, peace promotion and support to US civil authorities as "non-combat military operations other than war (MOOTW)".⁹ More specifically, this doctrine provides a representative list of MOOTW to include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, show of force, peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation (NEO), nation assistance, counterinsurgency, freedom of navigation, counterdrug, humanitarian assistance, protection of shipping and US civil support. The significance of recognizing MOOTW as a significant part of military shaping activities is that most of these activities lend themselves to deterrence or engagement and thus should be considered in the context of missions suitable for reservists.

Additionally, CINCs are directed to provide support for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) missions. Joint Pub 3-07.1 identifies indirect and direct support activities in which the military can engage. Many of these tasks are in support of civilian agencies, such as the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the purpose of alleviating political, social, economic and military causes of instability. CINC involvement may take the form of training, organizational assistance, advice, infrastructure development or tactical operations.¹⁰

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning* (CJCSM 3113.01) (Washington, D.C., February 1998), C-3

⁸ *Theater Engagement Planning*, C-5 through C-7.

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington D.C., 16 June 1995).

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense* (Joint Pub 3-07.1) (Washington, D.C., 26 June 1996), Executive Summary and Ch 1.

CINC Shaping Mission Considerations

In TEP planning, CINCs are to identify each proposed shaping activity against a defined objective, while considering factors such as forces to be used (even if they are not assigned to the CINC), their respective capabilities, specially required capabilities such as foreign languages, cultural appreciation and civilian skills, authority to implement the activity, required resources beyond the forces themselves (i.e., dollars, infrastructure, equipment, strategic transportation), participants, and duration. In considering combined exercises, CINCs must also designate the level; that is to say, whether it is level 1, requiring a wing, brigade or naval squadron/group; level 2, requiring a squadron, battalion or single ship; or level 3 requiring forces below the magnitude of level 2.¹¹

Regarding the selection of a Shaping objectives, CINCs must consider what makes the nation or region in question unstable, our own national interests in that area and what the recipient(s) consider helpful to their own stability. Assistant Secretary of Defense, H. Allen Holmes succinctly pointed to "failed or failing states" as causes of instability.¹² Paul Oosterling, a Naval War College student writing on flexible deterrent options in shaping, indicated that shaping missions are most effective in "nations ... attempting to develop a viable economy or in regions where democracy or independence is a relatively new concept."¹³

The recipient nation's perspective on causes of instability must not be ignored. To do otherwise, would risk alienation of just those partners we wish to join in stabilization efforts. Perhaps, for example, helping nations to combat poverty or political exclusion is more important to stabilization than creating a multi-national board on civil-military affairs from the perspective of the host nation.

Professor Luis Bitencourt Emilio of the Universidade Catolica de Brasilia, in his address on civil-military relations, provides a colorful example of this phenomenon. He compared the US and all its Latin American partners as co-dwellers in a high-rise condominium building. The US lives in the penthouse at the top and is, by far, the most wealthy of the occupants. In his post-cold war analogy, Bitencourt says

"Imagine that there is a heated discussion in one of these apartments. There is not enough money to pay for the children's school. A big hospital bill is on the

¹¹ Theater Engagement Planning, C-12 thru C-14.

¹² H. Allen Holmes, "Military Operations in the Post-Cold War Era," speech given at the Intelligence in Partnership Conference, Joint Military Intelligence College, Andrews Air Force Base, MD, June 26, 1997..

¹³ Paul S. Oosterling, "Flexible Deterrence Options as Theater Shaping tools: The Role of the US Navy's Oceanographic Fleet" (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 13 Feb 98), 11

table. The wife complains about the husband because he is not making enough money. The husband complains about the wife because she is not helping. The dinner has been burned. The baby is crying. Just then, somebody knocks on the door; it is the rich neighbor. He has come to invite the couple to a meeting in two hours to discuss a new security system for the building. It is easy to imagine how difficult it is for the couple to feel any sympathy for the rich neighbor's initiative. In the back of their minds, the owners of that chaotic apartment believe that a new security system may be useful, even necessary, for the future But right now?"¹⁴

CINCENT, General Zinni reinforces the message Bittincourt makes in his analogy. During a lecture to the CIA in 1996, General Zinni demonstrated how American military action meant to help persecuted Kurds in Northern Iraq had to be tempered by realities. If Americans just gave food away or provided free unlimited medical care, it would cause dependency and an unrealistic expectation amongst the recipients; not to mention interfere with local attempts to stimulate their own economy. It's better that American goods are sold to retailers at token wholesale prices and transported via local trucking.¹⁵

The point of this discussion is that the shaping objective must be realistically based, not only our national interests, but also with a clear eye to what approach and force compliment might truly reach the objective. Conversely, some approaches which might just exacerbate the already unstable situation the CINC has set out to resolve.

CINC Force Options for Fulfilling Shaping Needs

For shaping missions, CINCs can draw from the forces assigned to their respective commands from active and reserve components and Special Operations Command for shaping missions. The CINC can also ask for support from other supporting combatant commands, if needed and available. If a CINC depends on his active duty force to fulfill shaping needs, he will most likely find that few active duty personnel possess the language, cultural and civilian employment skills required to adequately meet certain shaping needs. Even Congressman Floyd Spence, Chairman of the House National Security Committee recognized a disparity between the ever increasing role to shape the regional

¹⁴ Donald E. Schultz, ed., *Conference Report on The Role of the Armed Forces in the America: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century*, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, April 1998) 98-99.

¹⁵ Anthony Zinni, "Somalia Operation", speech given to CIA (Washington, D.C., 1996).

security environment and the corresponding shrinkage of the active duty forces. He, therefore, has called upon reserve components to look for ways to "convert ...[their] capacity."¹⁶

CINCs can count on a small cadre of individuals who are trained foreign area experts or become so through experience. This cadre includes defense attachés, security assistance officers, foreign area officers and special operations forces.¹⁷ Although these individuals do fine work, they simply do not constitute a large enough cadre to effectively assume responsibilities for meeting shaping needs.

The more important question, however, regarding available forces, is what skills are paramount for each shaping task -- military or civilian? An understanding of this will help us determine whether active or reserve forces are more appropriate for each task. Before I come to that conclusion, I will explore shaping needs which can potentially be satisfied by reservists. [note: the purpose of the next section is *not* to promote a reservist cause; rather, it is to see where reservists can realistically contribute to Shaping missions].

Utility: Shaping Needs Which Can Potentially Be Fulfilled Best by Reservists

CINCs already use reservists in special operations, state partnership projects and other nation assistance projects such as construction and medical care. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War includes civil affairs, psychological operations, linguists support, medical aid, port security and engineering projects as missions requiring reserve talent.¹⁸ In its discussion of multinational operations, Joint Pub 3-07 lists the need to consider political, language and cultural barriers between the US and host nation(s) which must be overcome, as well as the need to establish a coordinating body for relations with Non-government Organizations (NGOs), Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and other federal governmental agencies.¹⁹ Comprehending that some reservists are employed by just the entities with which our military must coordinate and that many reservists are of ethnic and cultural backgrounds that would facilitate understanding, it's not hard to see that they can be effectively used in these capacities. Civilian lawyers within the reserves may very well be able to handle legal issues regarding refugees, displaced and detained civilians, civil affairs, claims,

¹⁶ Congressman Floyd Spence, "ROA National Security Report: Strategy versus Resources: The FY 1999 Defense Budget Debate in Context," *The Officer* 74, no 6 (July 1998), 29-30. Floyd Spence, "U.S. Reserve Forces: Evolving to Meet Needs of Changing Total Force," *The Officer* 74, no1 (January-February 1998), 18-20.

¹⁷ Although true that Defense Attachés and Security Assistance Officers do not work directly for CINCs, CINCs can indeed count on their support and expertise.

¹⁸ Joint Pub 3-07, p IV-11

¹⁹ Joint Pub 3-07, p IV-4.

contingency contracting, finances, and political liaison.²⁰ Reservists who are jailers, correctional officers, social workers or shelter providers can aid greatly in the administration of refugees and displaced or detained civilians.

The 1998 Special Operations Forces (SOF) Posture Statement identified civil affairs and psychological operations (Psyop) as special operations missions that are appropriate for Reservists, specifically because of the civilian skills they bring to the table. Civil Affairs units have been instrumental in coordinating food and shelter for refugees in Rwanda; running the nerve center for U.S. civilian agencies and NGOs and re-establishing the functions of government in Haiti; and restarting water and phone services and facilitating the election process in Bosnia.²¹ Although most other special operations missions are not appropriate for reservists in view of their demand on time and physical capabilities, some missions beyond Civil Affairs and Psyops can be facilitated by reservists. Reservists, through experience in international banking, physical security, small arms industry or freight forwarding may offer capabilities needed by SOF to tackle unknowns in the "counterterrorism" mission. Under the SOF "counterproliferation" mission, reservists who are involved in the arms trade, weapons development, air or sea freight forwarding, think tanks, or universities specializing in this topic can likely provide intelligence reporting, analysis support or advice. Engagement with Pakistan, for the purpose of counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is a key element of CENTCOM strategy²² that could be facilitated by reservists in the know. Under SOF "information operations", computer engineers, systems managers and programmers can be of great help in discovering the best ways to gain superiority.²³

Often, the people who know the nuances of personalities and the political scene in a country or region of interest are the U.S. businessmen and NGO officials working there. Through national intelligence collection programs, CINCs can gain foreign intelligence from those businessmen and NGO officials who are reservists. Although this is sensitive and is restricted to some degree by Executive Order 12333, the CINC can exploit this capability.

²⁰ Joint Pub 3-07, p IV-9

²¹ Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Civil Affairs Soldiers are Crucial to Peace," *Defense Issues* 11, no 60 (June 20, 1996). Remarks by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict before the 1996 Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference, Washington, D.C.

²² CENTCOM Strategy for South and Central Asia, U.S. Central Command, <www.centcom.mil/subregional_strat/asia_region.htm>, January 29, 1999. "Pakistan Army and Regional Stability," *Asian Defence Journal* (November 1994), 32-34.

²³ "Special Operations Forces Posture Statement," p 3.

Howard Handelman says the largest challenges to stability lie in economic, social and political underdevelopment and that amongst the most prevalent causes of underdevelopment are religious and ethnic conflict, unfair agrarian and land politics, and the results of rapid urbanization.²⁴ A CINC, in conjunction with NGOs, PVOs and other development or relief agencies, can provide non-combat aid through his reservists by mitigating the negative effects of rapid urbanization or dealing with refugees once internal conflict has caused people to flee, as was the case in Rwanda.²⁵ CINCs will see this need manifested as a prelude to conflict or in its settlement stage. They can attempt to mitigate social and economic problems caused by lack of infrastructure²⁶ with reservists possessing civilian skills in waste management, water treatment, waste water treatment, sewage control, road building, train/bus/airport/waterways/seaport management and planning, disease control, economic development, industrial development, inner city revitalization, city planning and utility planning.

CINCs can seek solutions to social problems causing lawlessness and subversion²⁷ through reservists with civilian jobs in juvenile delinquency, social services, child and youth service agencies, probation, prosecution, alternative sentencing, economic opportunities commissions, police departments, private voluntary organizations (PVOs) for battered women and children, PVOs for drug and alcohol abuse, and NGOs for recognition of minority rights and contributions.

They can seek solutions to political exclusion, legislative, executive and judicial transparency²⁸ through reservists with jobs or positions as elected or appointed officials, county voter registrars, local party members or officials, poll takers, judges, university specialists in political inclusion, and political think tank associates. In today's world, most nations view democratic governance as an answer to many of the causes of instability. We have often heard a variation of the theme that "well-established democracies do not make war on and rarely commit lesser violence against each other."²⁹ To this end, we find our own forces being used to promote democracy. For example, although not specifically sent to Bosnia for this reason, reservists from the 353d Civil Affairs Command assisted an NGO to register

²⁴ Howard Handelman, "The Challenge of Third World Development" (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ: 1996), p v.-viii.

²⁵ Stephen O. Wallace, "Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations," *Special Warfare* 9, no 1 (January 1996) 36-41.

²⁶ Joint Pub 3-07.1, I-3

²⁷ Joint Pub 3-07.1, vii.

²⁸ Joint Pub 3-07.1, IV-12

²⁹ R.J. Rummel, *Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 4.

3.5 million Bosnian voters. Reservists from this same unit supported USAID in assessing the judicial system after the breakup of the Yugoslavian judiciary.³⁰

CINCs can take on a serious role in political and economic development in post-conflict operations, in which liberators are expected to assume many of the responsibilities of an occupier. In post-DESERT STORM, CINCCENT created the Kuwait Task Force, consisting of the 352d Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserve among others, to restore the functions of the government of Kuwait. Of particular interest is that the Kuwait Task Force Commander chose a US Army Reserve major as his executive officer because, as a civilian, he was a member of the Senior Executive Service (general officer equivalent) and the Director of the USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.³¹

In Panama, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY called for the creation of a Civil-Military Operations Task Force headed by a General Officer. This task force ended up leading the newly installed government of Panama through the establishment of government services, public security, and a more sound judiciary. Reserve Civil Affairs personnel were involved, but it must be noted that coordination with reservists were less than stellar, key players did not speak Spanish and American attorneys, save one, did not understand how to establish a judiciary in Panama. Reservists with Spanish language skills and experience in governing could have played a bigger role initially than they did, resulting in much less confusion.³²

During peacetime, reservists who teach college or work in legislatures, can be used as adjunct professors at the Marshal Center in Garmisch, Germany, where we teach former Soviet military officers about democracy, budgeting and testifying to parliament.³³ Similar contacts can be made across the world.

Many reservists belong to chambers of commerce, international trade organizations, and/or sister city groups. These entities often seek opportunities to expand their reach and can in some cases be persuaded to establish programs to promote small businesses overseas. Reservists experienced in

³⁰ John J. Tuozzolo, "The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations" *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1997) 54-56.

³¹ John T. Fishel, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm*, (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute paper, 31 August 1992), vii-ix.

³² John T. Fishel, *Civil-Military Operations in the New World* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 65-79.

³³ William J. Perry, "Ten Things I never Imagined Doing Five Years Ago, *Defense Issues* 11, no 2 (January 18, 1996). Remarks made by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Business Week Forum, Washington, D.C. George A. Joulwan, "European Command's Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness" *Defense Issues* 11, no 41 (March 19, 1996). Remarks, CINC European Command, to Appropriations Subcommittee, House National Security Committee.

these programs can be called upon to advise host nation officials on establishing micro- and small-business solutions in regions where instability exists largely for the lack of income or opportunity.

Reservists who are agronomists or agro-businessmen can guide farmers or host nation agriculture ministries on better methods for growing and distributing food.

One method for deflecting the perceived threat posed by large standing armies in developing countries is to show them how to maintain combat readiness through a smaller reserve or guard program, rather than an imposing full-up, active duty military force. CINCs have used the National Guard Bureau's State Partnership program (SPP) to help eastern European countries with just such conversions.³⁴ The SPP enhances this process by tying similarities to partner selections. States with large ethnic populations are matched with the countries from which these ethnic groups originate. Ohio, for example, is partnered with Hungary due to Ohio's large population of Hungarians. The same goes for Texas with the Czech Republic and Illinois with Poland. Similarly, states and countries with common economic or physical traits are matched such as Louisiana with Uzbekistan for their common features of oil and saltwater coastlines.³⁵

CINCs can use reservists to demonstrate military support to civilian authority (MSCA). In exercise PEACESHIELD '97, California Guard members demonstrated to their Ukrainian counterparts how their civilian talents aid civilian police in riot control and fire fighters in controlling forest fires.³⁶

Active duty officers in command of peacekeeping missions have grown to appreciate the civilian skills brought into their units by the reservists, as well. Lt. Col. James Morris commented on the value of computer programmers when his computers were temperamental and of plumbers and electricians in making remote living quarters livable in the Sinai.³⁷

To demonstrate their dual role as citizen first and soldier when needed, the Guard sponsors Minuteman Fellowship Program. Individuals from partner nation militaries are invited as Minuteman Fellows to live in American homes, visit civilian workplaces, shop, and train with their National Guard host. Because of this exposure, some state agencies volunteer their aid to the economic development of their partner country. Community service organizations likewise get involved in promoting the fabric of

³⁴ Wolfe, Colleen. "Partners for Peace: California Guard Reaches Out Across the Globe to Provide Stability" *National Guard* (February 1998) 17.

³⁵ Kalber, Mark. "The National Guard State Partnership Program: A Bridge to America," *Army* (April 1998) 43.

³⁶ Wolfe, 17.

³⁷ McIntire Peters, Katherine. "Sinai Peace Unit Draws on Diverse Skills," *Army Times* (July 10, 1995) 20.

democratic societies. Guard members are employed at some of these state agencies and community service organizations and provide this nexus.³⁸

Joint Military Contact Teams have already proven successful in teaching militaries in new democracies the value of military transparency and the establishment of a military reserve. A case in point was the US team to Poland lead by US Navy Reserve Captain Charles R. B. Stowe in January 1994.³⁹

In short, there is definite utility in using reserves for some shaping missions. In general, shaping missions are most appropriate for reservists when they are short in duration; directly applicable to a nation's stability needs, as viewed by the host nation itself; and in satisfaction of a U.S. national interests.

To better envision specific shaping activities that have been discussed, view the table below. Shaping activities are divided into three groups: MOOTW missions, as listed in Joint Pub 3-07; shaping missions covered in TEP guidance, but not listed in Joint Pub 3-07; and shaping missions covered in Joint Pub 3-07.1 as IDAD.

One can quickly summarize the utility of reservists to a CINC's shaping mission by glancing at the right-most column labeled "Requires Civilian Skills." *IDAD jumps out as the reservist's real strength.* It is in development activities that reservist's civilian skills shine. [note: MSCA, nation assistance, support to counterinsurgency, joint contact teams and state partnerships are essentially IDAD missions]. If a CINC had to decide which missions reservists could do to alleviate active duty, I would recommend IDAD.

Equally important is the fact that reservists can and do assist the active duty military in many of the other shaping activities. I would say that the reservists can support the active duty with their civilian as well as military skills in counterterrorism, counterdrugs, humanitarian assistance, support to insurgency and visits, conference and exchanges; but not take a primary role. I would not recommend that a CINC relieve his active duty troops from these activities because these activities are primarily based on military capabilities; something the active duty is certainly geared to do well.

³⁸ "Sharing Democracy with the World -- The International Role of the National Guard," (Fact Sheet, The National Guard Bureau, Directorate of International Affairs: n.d.). William Matthews, "Democracy Takes Hold as Guard Members Plant the Seeds of Reform," *National Guard* 49, no 5 (May 1995) 22-24.

³⁹ Charles R.B. Stowe, "ROA National Security Report: Joint Military Contact Team Poland Building Regional Stability," *The Officer* 70, no 9 (September 1994) 25-27.

Table

P=Primary Role S=Secondary Role

Activity	Requires Military Skills	Requires Civilian Skills
MOOTW⁴⁰		
Arms Control	P	
Counterterrorism	P	S
Counterdrug	P	S
Sanction Enforcement	P	
Exclusion Zone Enforce	P	
Freedom of Navigation	P	
Freedom of Overflight	P	
Humanitarian Asst.	P	S
MSCA	S	P
Nation Assistance	S	P
Spt to Counterinsurgency	S	P
NEO	P	
Peace Operations	P	
Protection of Shipping	P	
Recovery Operations	P	
Show of Force	P	
Strikes and Raids	P	
Support to Insurgency	P	S
Non-MOOTW⁴¹		
Senior Officer Visits	P	S
Counterpart Visits	P	S
Ship Port Visits	P	
Conferences	P	S
Staff Talks	P	S
Personnel Exchanges	P	S
Unit Exchanges	P	
IMET/FMS/EDA	P	S
Combined Exercises	P	
Combined Training	P	
Combined Education	P	
Joint Contact Team	S	P
State Partnership		P
Flexible Deterrent Option	P	
IDAD⁴²		
Military Development	P	S
Political Development	S	P
Economic Development	S	P
Social Development	S	P

⁴⁰ Joint Pub 3-07, III-1.⁴¹ Theater Engagement Plan, C-11 through C-15.⁴² Joint Pub 3-07.1, Chap I.

Practicality: Issues Regarding Use of Reservists for Shaping

CINCs may recognize the value of and want to employ reservists' civilian skills; but can they actually access them? What stumbling blocks could get in the way? The first stumbling block regards personnel data. Are component personnel data bases complete enough that CINCs can locate individuals possessing skills they need? If not, what are components doing to capture this information, if anything? What are the mechanics for the CINC to access this information? The second stumbling block involves time availability. How much time can a reservist dedicate to a shaping mission? The third stumbling block deals with releasability from the military duty for which they were recruited. Are unit commanders willing to allow small numbers of their members to deploy on shaping missions? How does that impact the unit military mission? These questions beg even more questions regarding force mix, recruitment and unit mission alterations, which I will not treat here.

Capturing Civilian Skills Information. U.S. Code Title 10 directs all reserve components to include civilian occupational skills in their data bases.⁴³ The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) has directed each reserve component to report the civilian Occupation code using the Office of Management and Budget 1998 Standard Occupation Codes no later than 2002.⁴⁴ The Defense Manpower Data Center is in the process of prototyping a web browser application that will capture and update the new civilian occupation codes to help reserve members report their current civilian occupation to their respective service components.⁴⁵

Despite a common mandate, each component is dealing with this issue differently. Civilian skills data for the Marine Corps Reserve, maintained in the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS), follows OSD/RA guidance by including the current civilian occupational skill code, but hesitates to add any more information about civilian skills because they have no way of verifying reservists' actual skill level in their respective civilian occupations.⁴⁶

The Naval Reserve asks reservists to update their occupation data every year. Reservists are asked to complete a form asking for information on their current job, job-related capabilities and language skills. Information on past jobs (reflecting total capability) is not requested on the annual update form

⁴³ Reserve Components, U.S. Code Title 10--Armed Force, section 10204--Personnel, www.gpo.ucop.edu/cgi-bin/gpogate?waisdoc=1&doctype=T.../historical.access.gpo.go, January 26, 1999.

⁴⁴ Department of Defense Instruction 77340.54.

⁴⁵ Alain Goldsticker, Air National Guard Readiness Center, Personnel Office, e-mail interview by author, 28 Dec 98.

and would only be in the data base if individual reservists had once provided that information and data base operators did not purge old information. Although the Naval Reserve has this information in its data base, their procedure for accessing Reservists with special civilian skills is through Reserve-wide internet advertisement. If an individual is interested in leaving his or her job for the period requested, then he or she must submit a resume and apply for this active duty special work (ASDW) tour.⁴⁷

The Army Reserve is going beyond OSD/RA expectations by substituting the required older occupational codes with the new codes, so as to include occupations in newer technologies; adding sub fields so as to better describe reservists' civilian capabilities; and submitting their computer architecture for capturing and utilizing this information to other reserve components and to the Department of Defense so as to get all Reserve components on the same sheet of music.⁴⁸

The National Guard Bureau, through its State Partnership Program, asks state governors and adjutants general to accept partnerships with specific countries identified by CINCs and Ambassadors. Upon acceptance of a partnership, an adjutant general appoints a director for his state, who then seeks individual Guard members with the skills requested by a CINC. Although the Air National Guard and Army National Guard Readiness Centers maintain guard-wide personnel data bases with at least some information on civilian occupational skills, each state director seeks participants in his or her own manner.

Time Availability. Reservists commit to serve in uniform one weekend per month and two weeks per year. Civilian employers generally accept this arrangement and in fact, are required by law to accept it. According to 38 USC 43, reservists can normally accept voluntary deployments and extended active duty for a cumulative period not to exceed five years without fear of employer reprisal or loss of employment. Although reservists and their civilian employers generally understand this law, they also understand that there is an "out" for employers if their circumstances have changed during the reservist's absence such that an employer's refusal to re-employ the reservist can be justified.⁴⁹ Whether a reservist feels he or she can afford to leave a civilian employer for periods beyond the basic weekend per month and two weeks per year commitment, is largely personal; unless the individual is

⁴⁶ Kay Young, HQ Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve, telephone conversation with author, 26 Jan 99.

⁴⁷ Sheila Rausch, U.S. Naval Reserve, Office of Defense Cooperation, Brussels, Belgium, interview by author, 29 Jan 99.

⁴⁸ Steve Salzell, US Army Reserve Personnel Command, Personnel Propriety Office, St. Louis, MO, telephone conversation with author, 26 Jan 99. The system used by the Army Reserve is called the Civilian Acquired Skills Data Base and is a copy of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Planning Support System and is run off the same server.

called to active duty under provisions of federal law which could apply to some shaping missions.⁵⁰ Focus group research conducted by the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve predictably found that time away from work harmed small businesses the most; whereas large company employer usually found fewer problems related to reservists' time away from work.⁵¹

Release by Unit Commanders. [Reservists are recruited to fulfill specific military tasks. The unit pays for them to be trained and expects them to be available for unit drills and deployments. The operations tempo for reserve units is at an all-time high since the drawdown began in the early 1990s. This makes it difficult for commanders to give their people up for missions other than their own; especially when many unit missions require volunteers.

Conclusion

To conclude, let's return to the central questions of utility and practicality of part-time reservists in shaping missions. Can CINCs "utilize" reservists for shaping missions? The answer is YES. Reservists can play a primary role in development activities at force level 3 under Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). CINCs can even be more innovative in the way they attack counterterrorism, counterdrugs, insurgency support, humanitarian assistance and exchanges by employing reservists' civilian skills to these problems; but should not feel confident about giving the reserves the primary role in these missions.

The problem arises when we discuss practicality. A CINC cannot currently access this talent; that is to say beyond Army civil affairs and small, ad hoc pockets of the reserve force. There is simply no comprehensive system by which necessary data is being captured, stored and manipulated for a CINC's benefit. The high operations tempo has taken its toll as well. Although reservists may be anxious to show what they know, they must also be sensitive to their time away from their civilian employers and to the commitments they made to serve their respective units in their military roles.

⁴⁹ Employment And Reemployment Rights Of Members Of The Uniformed Services, US Code Title 38, section 43. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/38/ch43.html>

⁵⁰ 38 USC 43, Section 4312, par. (C)(4) ...ordered to active duty (other than for training) in support, as determined by the Secretary concerned, of an operational mission for which personnel have been ordered to active duty under section 12304 of title 10; (D) ordered to active duty in support, as determined by the Secretary concerned, of a critical mission or requirement of the uniformed services; or called into Federal service as a member of the National Guard under chapter 15 of title 10 or under section 12406 of title 10.

⁵¹ "Employer Support For the Guard and Reserve Research and Findings," *The Officer* 74, no 8 (September 1998), 36.

The problem of practicality can, however, be overcome; and it should be. I will present some thoughts that should be explored in order to accomplish it.

It is of utmost importance that we accept the idea that shaping, as one of the three pillars of our national security strategy, *is important*. Shaping is the cheapest method for deterring aggression in potentially unstable regions of the world and is absolutely essential before we can completely pull out of an area of conflict. And, the fact is, we spend most of our time doing it in one form or another; so *it is important* and, therefore incumbent upon us to find the best way to conduct these operations.

In order to make reservists more accessible to CINCs, I recommend the following ideas be explored more fully. First, the Defense Manpower Data Center should consider establishing a procedure and format for capturing applicable data from all reservists; keeping it regularly updated; and making it accessible to all CINCs. Second, considerations should be given to making military occupational skill codes match shaping needs. Third, reserve component roles should be reconsidered so that those individuals whose civilian skills relate to shaping needs can be organized into shaping units; therefore redressing the releasability problem. Fourth, consideration should be given to establishing a joint organization other than simply "Reserve Affairs," under unified commanders for the express purpose of shaping with reserves. Fifth, reserve recruiters should consider recruiting part-time reservists directly from the types of civilian occupations that can support IDAD missions.

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